

Adolf Hitler, Carl Diem, Werner Klingeberg, and the Thousand Year Reich:

Nazi Germany and Its Envisioned Post-War Olympic World

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In his contribution to the International Olympic Committee's three volume Centennial history,¹ Karl Lennartz wrote:

Whereas the Nazi regime showed itself relatively well behaved in the run up to and during the Olympic Games (1936), it sought immediately afterwards to extend systematically its influence over the Olympic Movement, not altogether unsuccessfully, as born out for example by the founding of the International Olympic Institute in Berlin, the incorporation of the IOC's official bulletin into Carl Diem's *Olympische Rundschau*, the award of the Olympic Cup to the 'Kraft durch Freude' association, the presentation of the Olympic Diploma to Leni Riefenstahl for her film on the 1936 Olympic Games and Werner Klingeberg's assumption to the position of IOC Secretary General. The IOC was obliged to look on helplessly as the half-Jewish Lewald, whose prestige within the Committee had reached its apogee with the splendour of the Berlin Games, was forced to resign on the instructions of the National Socialists to make way for a party member, Walter von Reichnau. Lewald's successor on the EC (Executive Committee) was the convinced National Socialist Karl Ritter von Halt.²

Lennartz's menu of German efforts to gain Olympic power following the 1936 Games merits further examination, and more, causes one to pause in order to ponder the hypothetical question: did Germany, if victorious in World War II, envision itself as the omnipotent lord of the five-ring Olympic world? An expansion of Lennartz's assertions cited above provides a framework for providing an answer.

Following its glorious hosting of the 1936 Olympic Winter and Summer Games in Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Berlin, respectively, Germany's vision for world dominance led to feverish rearmament and military campaigns against its European neighbors.³ Might control of the Modern Olympic Movement have been included in Germany's agenda for Third Reich's future?

In the spring of 1937, basking in the propaganda success produced by the Games of the 11th Olympiad, Adolf Hitler visited the Berlin showrooms of architect Albert Speer, fondly called *Generalbauinspektor* [Inspector General of Buildings] by Hitler. Speer was a member the Führer's inner circle of Obersalzberger.⁴ There, in the eerie light of the studio, the two men gazed at Speer's giant architectural rendition of Hitler's vision for the establishment of a huge center in Nuremberg for the celebration of National Socialism and German culture.⁵ As Speer recounted in his memoirs:

We stood alone in front of the nearly seven-foot high model of the stadium of four-hundred thousand people. It had been set up at precisely eye level. Every detail had been rendered, and powerful spotlights illuminated it, so that with only a little imagination we could conceive the effect of this structure. Alongside the model were the plans, pinned up on boards. Hitler turned to these. We talked about the Olympic Games, and I pointed out, as I had done several times before, that my athletic field did not have the prescribed Olympic proportions. Without any change of tone, as if it were a matter settled beyond the possibility of discussion, Hitler observed: 'No matter. In 1940 the Olympic Games will take place in Tokyo. But thereafter, they will take place in Germany for all time to come, in this stadium. And then, we will determine the measurements of the athletic field.'⁶

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Empty rhetoric? Perhaps, but with the premier of Leni Riefenstahl's acclaimed film documentary *Olympia* appearing on the world stage in 1938 and the eventual award of the 1940 Olympic Winter Games to Garmisch-Partenkirchen, it appeared that the Führer's vision of Germany's future in Olympic matters was well on its way to fruition. In this vision, Carl Diem and his young protégé, Werner Klingeberg, were uniquely equipped to play roles.

Much is known of Carl Diem, one of the most noted figures, if not *the* most noted name, in German Olympic history. Born in 1882, he was an avid athlete as a young man. Denigrating the value of his country's powerful but archaic Turner Sport Movement, an institution entrenched in the Fatherland for over a century, Diem became a dedicated enthusiast and advocator of a German sporting movement parallel to those developing rapidly in *fin de siècle* Anglo-Saxon nations. Diem followed a career path in teaching and sport administration, rising rapidly to head what became known as the German National Sports University, founded in Berlin in 1920 and moved to Cologne following World War II. He traveled widely, became a prolific lecturer and writer, and often consulted on sport and Olympic matters, particularly in Europe. As is well known, he was a driving force behind the organization of the Games of the 11th Olympiad in Berlin, an event bathed in the glory of a "new Germany," a nation destined to lead, as Diem himself put it, "a victory charge for a better Europe."⁷ *Did Diem share the Nazi view of Aryan supremacy and the Third Reich's Hitlerian-envisioned destiny for Germany?*

Far less is known of Werner Klingeberg. Born in 1910, he was a student protégé of Diem's at the National Sports University in Berlin during the early years of its existence. While still a student, Klingeberg traveled with Diem to America, helping his mentor in the management of the German Olympic team for the 1932 Los Angeles Games. As well, he served as a close assistant to Diem in the organization of the Berlin Games four years later. He was counsel to two designated Olympic host cities (Tokyo and Helsinki). Finally, he served as official IOC Secretary-General throughout the years of World War II (1940-1945). Speculation has been offered that he may have been a member of Germany's well-developed foreign intrigue and intelligence department, a spy who operated inside the cloak of a benign international sports organization known as the International Olympic Committee.

By the outbreak of World War II, ushered in with Germany's attack on Poland in the beginning of September 1939, certain events had already transpired involving both Carl Diem and Werner Klingeberg in a quest to improve German power and influence in the Modern Olympic Movement. On 2 September 1937 the Baron Pierre de Coubertin, exalted founder of the Modern Olympic Movement, passed away in Geneva, the Swiss city of his final residence. Shortly before he died Coubertin penned a letter to Carl Diem in which he stated:

I wasn't able to complete what I wanted to accomplish. What would be dearest by far to me would be the creation of a very modest small institute in Germany, in memory of the Games of the XI Olympiad, to which I would leave all my papers, documents, unfinished projects concerning the whole of modern Olympism in order to dispel inaccuracies. I think an Olympic Study Center, not necessarily in Berlin, would more than anything else support progress of this movement and preserve it from ideological deviation of which I am so fearful.⁸

Exactly what did Coubertin mean by the term "ideological deviation?" By the following year, 1938, Diem had been successful in beginning to publish and edit *Olympic Bulletin* (formerly and presently, *Olympic Review*). Renamed *Olympische Rundschau*, it was printed only in German and circulated without cost to all members of the Olympic family throughout the world, Diem published the baron's last letter to him in the first edition under his editorship.⁹ In 1938, too, Diem was successful in carrying out another of Coubertin's last wishes, transferring from Lausanne and establishing in Berlin, the concept of an International Olympic Institute. Luckily for the survival of the early archival record of the Modern Olympic Movement under the aegis of Pierre de Coubertin, Diem was not immediately able to effect the transfer to Berlin of the Modern Olympic Movement's archival records and papers. But this act he fully intended to accomplish at a future date. We will return to this point later.

Werner Klingeberg: The IOC's "Man in Tokyo"

Immersed in the run-up to preparing for the Berlin Games was a strong bid from Tokyo to host the Summer Games scheduled for 1940. Accordingly, Baillet-Latour paid a March 1936 visit to the Far East to witness in person Tokyo's prospectus for hosting an Olympic festival. He was impressed, despite the rapidly climaxing realities of a Japan-China military confrontation. Baillet-Latour argued strongly on behalf of Tokyo's bid and at the IOC Session held in Berlin in July 1936, Tokyo was officially awarded the host city distinction for the organization of the Games of the 12th Olympiad. Accordingly, IOC President Baillet-Latour broached the subject to Tokyo officials of an IOC technical sport advisor to aid the organizing committee. His first thought for such an advisor was for a member of the German organization team for the Berlin Games to serve, namely Carl Diem, but his "private affairs," as Diem wrote Baillet-Latour, prohibited his consideration.¹⁰ Instead, prompted by Diem, in late March 1936 Baillet-Latour posed a substitute to the Japanese, "a man whom I may nominate and whom I feel would be perfect for this position . . . Dr. Diem's right hand man [who] speaks German, French, Italian, English and a little Japanese."¹¹ That man was Werner Klingeberg. In September 1936 Baillet-Latour learned from Klingeberg that Japanese Olympic officials had visited Berlin on an information

and fact-finding mission and that he had been busy helping to host the delegation.¹² Shortly after receiving Klingeberg's information, Baillet-Latour offered him the position in Tokyo as IOC technical advisor.¹³ On 18 March 1937, Klingeberg accepted.¹⁴ That summer, in July 1937, the IOC convened in Warsaw to conduct its 37th Session. Amidst other business, one item of which named Sapporo as host of the 1940 Winter Games, Werner Klingeberg was formally confirmed as IOC Technical Representative to Japan's summer and winter Games organization teams.¹⁵

By the late summer of 1937 Klingeberg prepared to depart for Japan, detailing his traveling itinerary to Baillet-Latour as well as the results of meetings he had recently completed with leaders of various sports bodies.¹⁶ By October, accompanied by two secretarial aides, Klingeberg was on his way to Tokyo to take up his duties. On route he visited Canada and the United States, stopping in Hamilton, Ontario to visit with Canadian IOC member George McLaren Brown, as well as Chicago, where he met with Avery Brundage. He also visited San Francisco, where he rendered a speech to "International House" residents.¹⁷ On October 30th *The Japan Advertiser* reported his landing in Tokyo, quoting a Klingeberg remark in his arrival statement that "the International Olympic Committee fundamentally has nothing to do with political issues."¹⁸ By this time, of course, Imperial Japan was at war with China and the prospect of Olympic Games being staged in Tokyo sparked daily debate in the world press.

In Tokyo, Klingeberg and his German secretarial aides plunged into advisory duties. The Japanese were pleased with their efforts. "Nothing can give me greater pleasure than to be able to report to you that preparations of our Olympic Organizing Committee are smoothly progressing under the cooperation and assistance of Mr. Klingeberg and Misses Hartmann and Knoller," wrote Dr. Matsuzo Nagai (Secretary of the Tokyo Organizing Committee) to Baillet-Latour scarcely three weeks after the arrival of the German contingent.¹⁹ A month after his arrival in Japan, Klingeberg dutifully reported to Baillet-Latour of "Positive progress." In a document labeled "Report of the Technical Adviser," he also wrote at length of Japan's preoccupation with the war, a gathering storm that tempered Olympic preparations.²⁰ Despite Klingeberg's trepidations, Baillet-Latour continued to be optimistic that the Games, both Winter and Summer, would take place as scheduled. As time passed, however, the Japanese became increasingly uncertain. In a confidential letter to Baillet-Latour in February 1938, Soyeshima posed the possibility of the IOC "taking them back" (the Olympic Games).²¹ A month later, in March, the IOC held its 38th Session in Cairo. Despite all rumors to the contrary, Japan declared that it did indeed intend to stage the Games irrespective of the persistence of war with China. Klingeberg, present in Cairo to report on Tokyo's progress, lent verbal support to Japan's resolve. Many IOC members, however, harbored severe reservations about the Games remaining in Japan. In the face of an offer from Finland to stage both Summer and Winter Games if Japan could not, the members voted to give the IOC Executive Committee full authority to transfer the Games accordingly if the need arose.

There was an important postscript to the Cairo proceedings. Werner Klingeberg, in the absence of IOC Secretary-General Lt. Colonel A. G. Berdez, who was too ill in Lausanne to attend the meetings, was pressed into service as temporary secretary. In Cairo, Klingeberg dutifully recorded the minutes.²² This proved to be an important spontaneous act. Klingeberg, in the face of Berdez's continuing decline in health, would eventually be appointed to the post IOC Secretary-General.²³ Diem's young protégé was "moving up" in the hierarchy of IOC "power" positions.

Werner Klingeberg: The IOC's "Man in Helsinki"

Two months after IOC members had returned home from the Cairo Session, Japan abandoned preparations for both the 1940 Summer and Winters Games and turned them back to the IOC. Meeting in September in Brussels, the Executive Committee awarded the Summer Games to Helsinki and the Winter Games to St. Mortiz.²⁴ A protracted dispute with the International Ski Federation, whose headquarters were located in Switzerland, over the status of alpine skiing in the Winter Games, particularly with respect to the issue of amateurism and the eligibility of professional ski instructors, caused them to be withdrawn from Switzerland and given to Garmisch-Partenkirchen.²⁵

With the 1940 Summer Games now in the hands of the Finns, Werner Klingeberg was uprooted from Tokyo and dispatched to Helsinki to carry out the same IOC Technical Adviser duties for Finnish organizing officials as he had for the Japanese. In late September/early October 1938 Klingeberg made his way to Helsinki, pausing in Lausanne to visit Berdez as well as Berlin to pay his respects to his mentor, Carl Diem. Berdez's health concerned him, he reported in a letter to Baillet-Latour. "If any emergency should happen," he wrote, "I am so imformed (sic) about everything and immediately could leave for Lausanne . . . As I have told you in Bruxelles, I consider it as a great honor to be asked by the IOC to take over at a certain date the work of the Secretary."²⁶ The "emergency," of course, was that point in time when Berdez's health was reduced to such a state that he could no longer carry out the job of Secretary-General.

Klingeberg arrived in Helsinki on 10 October. Complementing his duties in Helsinki's Olympic organization plans were Klingeberg's preparations for the IOC session scheduled for London the following June. Though deteriorating badly, Berdez sent him helpful advice and instructions.²⁷ Throughout the latter months of 1938 and much of 1939, Klingeberg wrote regularly to Baillet-Latour from his office in Helsinki. At the beginning of September 1939 German Wehrmacht units marched into Poland, com-

mencing an inflammation that would all too soon envelop the world. With Germany's political and military ambitions openly evident, Klingeberg began to experience paranoia at being a German national in a foreign country on the brink of war. On 16 September he reported to Baillet-Latour on recent events. "It seems advisable that I am writing this report myself from my apartment," he complained, "as some small minds at the office consider it good behavior to look through my papers probably to find some conspiracy of the IOC against Finland."²⁸ *Was Klingeberg's paranoia motivated by the fact that he may have been a spy in the service of the Third Reich?* Indeed, this was an accusation leveled on him by Sigfrid Edström following World War II. Later in the same letter, Klingeberg wrote a revealing statement: "Edstroem even went so far to ask me if he should write to Tschammer (*Reichsportleiter*) that I remain here and not called to duty." *What "duty" (political or military), under whose authority?* Klingeberg continued: "I gave him (Edström) free hand but mentioned that I am always ready to my (sic) wherever my homefolks want to put me in these days."²⁹ *What "home folks," what duty?*

In a series of letters written to Baillet-Latour over the course of 1939, Klingeberg reported on Olympic preparations in Helsinki, confident that Finland's neutral status would insulate it from the war and preserve the celebration of the Games of the 12th Olympiad. By late 1939, too, Klingeberg had heard from Edström to "remain (in Helsinki) as long as possible."³⁰ After correspondence with Diem and Karl Ritter von Halt (German IOC Member), Klingeberg told Baillet-Latour that he expected "permission from official sources" to continue his duties in Helsinki.³¹ *What official sources? What duties?* Further, Klingeberg proposed a two to three month leave of absence to return to Germany . . . "I imagine I could manage to get some useful work also now at home." As it turned out, Klingeberg did indeed "get useful work at home." He was assigned to accompany Leni Riefenstahl on what turned out to be her less than triumphant coast-to-coast tour of America marketing her epic film of the 1936 Summer Games.³² In her memoirs, Riefenstahl described Klingeberg as "secretary of Carl Diem in the German Olympic Committee." According to Riefenstahl, the assignment of Klingeberg and his fellow escort, Ernst Jäger, was made by Joseph Göbbels, Minister of Propaganda.³³

On 25 November 1939 Baillet-Latour had the unfortunate task of informing all IOC members that the Vth Olympic Winter Games would "not be celebrated in 1940."³⁴ In late November, too, Russia invaded Finland, bombing Helsinki in the process. Klingeberg faced a dilemma. Obviously, Olympic Games in 1940 were becoming a dimmer possibility as each day passed. The activities of the Helsinki Organizing Committee diminished rapidly, in turn negating the need for Klingeberg's presence in Finland. Should he proceed to Lausanne to take up the resident Secretary-General duties of Lt. Col. Berdez, who died on 3 January 1940? But journeying to Lausanne represented problems for Klingeberg, particularly in obtaining a visa to enter Switzerland. A visa, he told Baillet-Latour, was dependent on "the permission of certain authorities in my country."³⁵ *What authorities?* Klingeberg posed an alternative. "In my present work here, even if it is outside of the olympic movement . . . I believe that I can do some good to our friends in Finland, suffering now under the ruthless attack from the east. I feel myself to a certain degree obliged to do my part as I had spent with them all the time of the well-carried on Olympic preparations which they were forced to stop."³⁶ *What "present work here outside the Olympic Movement"?* Baillet-Latour responded: "Reading between the lines I guess your heart is in Helsinki and that the idea that you might have to go to Lausanne makes you miserable. Once more I see how well you understand your duty . . . and all of us will admire this behaviour of yours under so very difficult conditions."³⁷ *What duty, to whom?* Klingeberg responded within a week: ". . . you got my ideas and read them right between the lines."³⁸

Klingeberg remained in Helsinki. On 16 March 1940 he wrote a long letter to Baillet-Latour informing him that a peace treaty had been signed between Russia and Finland the night before. As to renewed energy for staging the Games as scheduled, Klingeberg was not optimistic:

My position as a German and my previous well founded experience with them over here may be responsible for my decision to keep entirely in the background and to step forward only when they should ask for it. Personally I have entirely withdrawn from my contacts with the OC and not said a word, when they did not even keep agreements, when I left voluntarily their organization. But as I had my personal convictions and made my decision according to them, I also had to look to some means of existence which were assured through a job I accepted here and which I am keeping at the moment on requests from official sources back home.³⁹

Who might those "official sources" have been, and what was the nature of the job accepted? Baillet-Latour wrote back five days later, advising that hopes for the Games being held still existed but that if the decision was his alone he would cancel them.⁴⁰ On April 5th Klingeberg wrote a three page single spaced epistle to Baillet-Latour detailing the situation in Finland and lamenting the fact that a decision one way or the other on holding the 1940 Games had not been made. And finally, there appeared in Klingeberg's letter a notable remark: "Diem's inquiry on my side (behalf) has very favorable results. One appreciates the appointment very much, promises all support and had only one reservation to ask me for the time of the Finnish/Russian War to stay over here with the freedom to do all necessary IOC work."⁴¹ *What appointment?*

A month later President Baillet-Latour wrote to all IOC members, informing them that the 1940 Summer Games would not be staged.⁴² Following Baillet-Latour's official announcement on the fate of the 1940 Olympic Games, a hastily organized sports festival involving Finnish, German, and Swedish athletes was held in Stockholm to commemorate the 4th anniversary of the Berlin Games of 1936. Klingeberg journeyed from Helsinki to attend, as did Diem, Ritter von Halt, and von Tschammer und Osten from Germany. Upon his return to Helsinki, Klingeberg began to make plans to leave Finland, reporting to Baillet-Latour . . . "I am busy to collect the valuable material which may be useful for a new Olympic future which I certainly hope to come."⁴³ *Whose "Olympic future," the IOC's or Germany's?*

In the summer of 1940 Belgium was invaded and occupied by German troops. Every one of Baillet-Latour's grand thoroughbred horses was confiscated, as were all other pure-bred steeds in the country.⁴⁴ The Nazis sent emissaries to Brussels, among them the well-placed Carl Diem, to converse with Baillet-Latour on how a "new Fatherland" meant to "rejuvenate" the Games under German aegis. Baillet-Latour was told he would continue as President of the IOC, in effect, an envisioned puppet of the German state.⁴⁵ A "new IOC" was to be packed with German members. In early January 1941, on the very eve of his departure from Helsinki, Klingeberg penned his last letter to Baillet-Latour written from Finland. Apologizing for an inability to visit him in Belgium on his way to France, he related that he had "to leave immediately for Paris . . . to be short, I have been transferred from the head-offices to take over the DNB-Office (Deutsche News Bureau) at Paris . . ."⁴⁶ *What "head offices," and by what authority?* Later that year, Klingeberg wrote to Madame Lydia Zanchi, devoted long-time IOC secretarial staff member in Lausanne.⁴⁷ He forwarded his address in Paris: "M. Werner Klingeberg, c/o Monsieur W. Frey (DNB), Hotel Majestic."⁴⁸ It has come to the authors' attention that the Hotel Majestic building in Paris during the German occupation was the local headquarters of the dreaded Gestapo.⁴⁹ *Was the DNB a dimension of the Gestapo's French activities?*

There would be no additional correspondence between Klingeberg and Baillet-Latour. The aging IOC President, isolated, dejected, torn by the news of the death of his son in December 1941, "having lost control of the scattered pieces of the Olympic Movement,"⁵⁰ died in his sleep on 6/7 January 1942. He had requested a simple family funeral. But his wife, living during the war in Bavaria with her brother (Duke Clary-Aldringen), bent to German pressure and a large public funeral was held in St. Jacques Cathedral in Brussels. Hitler was personally represented by Ritter von Halt. Carl Diem traveled from Germany to attend, as did Werner Klingeberg from Paris. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Göbbels sent impressive floral arrangements. An Olympic flag draped the coffin, overlaid in part by a huge wreath adorned with both Nazi swastika and Imperial German eagle, arranged in place by two uniformed German soldiers.⁵¹ German testimonial orations given at the ceremonies contrasted sharply with the more subdued, dignified eulogies rendered by IOC representatives from Belgium and the Netherlands.⁵² Following the funeral Klingeberg wrote to Madame Zanchi describing the event.⁵³

Scarcely had Baillet-Latour been put to rest before Diem appeared in Lausanne to transfer Coubertin's Olympic papers and records to Berlin. On the events of Diem's visit to Lausanne in early 1942, our sole insight is rendered by John Lucas's interpretation of reminiscence remarks made to him by Madame Lydia Zanchi in an interview carried out in 1960. Olympic historians, however, have often cited Zanchi's recall as related by Lucas.⁵⁴ According to Zanchi: "At the height of the war, I was left alone in Lausanne. When Professor Diem attempted to remove the Olympic headquarters to Germany, I hid the most important documents in the cellar, and convinced the community that Diem was a spy. I alerted Mr. Edstroem of Sweden."⁵⁵ The result of Zanchi's letter to Edström prompted the Swede to travel to Switzerland later in 1942 to lock away the IOC's records in a secure bank vault.⁵⁶

With the sphere of German geo-political influence and military fortunes disintegrating rapidly on all fronts by the summer of 1944, Klingeberg returned to Germany in advance of the Allied surge across Europe. From his family home in Itzehoe/Holstein, he wrote to Madame Zanchi on several matters, not the least of which was a request to be paid monies due him in his role as IOC Secretary-General. He signed his letter "Sekretar des CIO."⁵⁷ Two final letters were written to Zanchi by Klingeberg before the end of the war, both of them inquiring about money in a Swiss bank due him for his services.⁵⁸

The war ended for Germany in early May 1945. Most of the scattered remnants of Nazidom were rounded up for accountability. Some were brought to justice at Nuremberg; others were detained for a period but escaped punishment. And some avoided discovery altogether. Both Diem and Klingeberg survived the war. Diem was queried by American officials and released. Klingeberg was never detained.

Rising almost immediately from the devastation of a defeated Germany was renewed energy on Klingeberg's part to recover monies earned for his activities in the service of the IOC as well as his work with the Helsinki organizing committee. Relative to IOC Secretary-General duties, Klingeberg's understanding was that his earnings (40 pounds sterling per month) were to be deposited in a Lausanne bank. In post-war impoverishment, he now wanted it. Further, some of his earnings from the Helsinki Committee had been deposited in a Swedish bank. He requested that a letter from IOC officials be sent to the bank in Stockholm so that the funds might be released and sent to him in Germany. Money draining from national economies in post-war Europe was a vexing problem and banks took every precaution before parting with it. In Klingeberg's case, they wanted to know how he had earned it and under what jurisdiction. It took five years before Klingeberg was only partially successful. Between May 1945 and December 1950 Klingeberg corresponded with Madame Zanchi, Otto Mayer (recently-appointed IOC Secretary-General), and IOC Presi-

dent Edstrøm in an effort to be served. The responsibility, in the end, was Edstrøm's, the prime decision maker on IOC financial affairs during and directly following the war. The IOC was practically broke, however. Klingeberg's Swiss money, if there had been any accumulated, had disappeared.⁵⁹ With mounting frustration, Klingeberg finally engaged a Swedish lawyer, Gösta Nisser, to represent him. Getting a lawyer into the act not only angered Edstrøm, it also energized him. Forwarded a copy of Klingeberg's letter to Mayer of 25 November 1950 requesting redress yet again, Edstrøm responded to the IOC Secretary-General at once. "I have received your letter of November 28th concerning Mr. Klingeberg," he wrote. . . . "Time after time Klingeberg appears and states that he has done a lot of work for us. This work is unknown to me. I return his letter to you and ask you to see, if in the minutes of the IOC of June 1939 we have instructed Klingeberg to carry out certain missions for us in Helsinki. If so is the case, has he given any report?" Edstrøm concluded, "When I receive your answer about this matter, I will let you know what we shall do. I do not want to telephone or write to Mr. Gosta Nisser in Stockholm. He is a lawyer and will probably sue me for the money, if he knew that I had anything to do with it. In the meantime you can write to Mr. Klingeberg that you have received his letter and will look into the matter."⁶⁰

The lengthy saga came to a close with a letter in early December 1950 from Edstrøm to Mayer, in effect, delegating Mayer to provide the statement needed by the Stockholm bank for the release Klingeberg's "quarantined" money. The importance of Edstrøm's letter necessitates its full quotation. He wrote:

Your letter of December 2nd received. I have spoken to Mr. Nisser, who told me that Klingeberg has two accounts with a Swedish commercial bank, together amounting 10,000 Sw. Cr. Klingeberg has told Mr. Nisser that he earned his money during the time he was Secretary for the I.O.C. and Mr. Nisser would like to have a certification from you that so has been the case. It is forbidden to export money from Sweden without permission from the fugitive office and they must know that Klingeberg has got hold of his money in an honest way. Mr. Nisser asked me, if Klingeberg was an honourable man and I said that he was a very magisterial and hard-working man, but about his honesty I could not give him any information. Nisser told me that Klingeberg had stated that he has all the time been outside the nazist (sic) party and lived in foreign countries to avoid them. Nisser asked me, if this was true and I told him that I could not give him any information about this matter. The fact is that Klingeberg during the time he was in Helsinki acted as a spy for the Germans. I should not be surprised, if he earned his money through this work. I therefore propose that you simply give a statement that Klingeberg has been a technical counselor of the I.O.C. from 1936 to 1939 and that he during that time was paid a certain salary.⁶¹

Mayer complied and Klingeberg finally recovered his money.

In post-war Germany Carl Diem and Karl Ritter von Halt remained active in Olympic matters, keeping in touch with old friend Sigfrid Edstrøm and aiding immeasurably in reestablishing a National German Olympic Committee.⁶² This was no mean task, as Germany was split between East and West. IOC member Ritter von Halt barely survived the final stages of the war, taking part in the defense of Berlin as a member of the *Volkssturm* (People's Militia). He was detained in a Russian POW camp for almost five years. Upon his release he reestablished himself with German Olympic affairs, as had Diem shortly after the conclusion of the war. Carl Diem died in 1962, von Halt in 1964. Neither lived to experience the clear definition between the Olympic teams of the two Germanys, a full-fledged reality not seen until the Munich Games in 1972.

Following the war, Klingeberg entered the German diplomatic service, serving in various European, African, Far Eastern, American, and South American posts. His last assignment was in Guyana. Klingeberg also remained in touch with Olympic affairs, albeit from a much greater distance than his mentor Carl Diem. He subscribed to the IOC's reestablished *Olympic Review*. He wrote to Otto Mayer in Lausanne, with whom his relationship had always been friendly, despite the IOC Secretary-General having been the awkward "go-between" in the Nisser/Edstrøm affair. Mayer replied in cordial terms.⁶³ When Monique Berlioux succeeded Mayer, Klingeberg wrote to her too, introducing himself and detailing his lengthy and close working relationship with Baron Pierre de Coubertin, Count Henri Baillet-Latour, Avery Brundage, Karl Ritter von Halt, and "meinem Mentor, Dr. Carl Diem." For good reasons, of course, he did not list Sigfrid Edstrøm among his esteemed Olympic colleagues. In this last known "Olympic letter," written at age 65, Klingeberg offered his Olympic library to the IOC and rang down the curtain of his Olympic life by canceling his subscription to *Olympic Review*.⁶⁴ Monique Berlioux responded in gracious tones, addressing him as "Your Excellency," in deference to his status as *Botschafter* (retired ambassador).⁶⁵ Klingeberg died in Germany in 1982.

Conclusions

What might be said at this time in the way of conclusions with reference to this essay's title? Much is speculation, of course, but of some things there is no doubt. For instance, what lurked in Adolf Hitler's mind for Germany's destiny in the post-war Modern Olympic Movement? Though harsh, it is quite plain. Envision, if you will, an International Olympic Committee with a voting

majority in the arms of Nazi handpicked sycophants. Further, envision Olympic Games permanently staged in the Führer's great stadium planned for Nuremberg, affairs surely to be enveloped in even greater Nazi-oriented spectacle than that presented in both Garmisch-Partenkirchen and Berlin in 1936. And finally, envision an Olympic Games with no Mark Spitzes, no Wilma Rudolphs nor Carl Lewises, no Olga Korbut nor Nadia Comanecis, no Kip Keinos nor Abebe Bikilases, no Greg Louganises nor Xiaosa-haung Lis, indeed, no members of Hitler's envisioned "helot races" of the Empire.

And, what of Carl Diem and Werner Klingeberg in all this? To be just, Diem simply does not belong to the same Nazi visionary genre as Adolf Hitler. Despite Madame Zanchi's charges that he attempted to transfer the IOC headquarters to Germany and that he was a German spy, Diem was a demonstrated and dedicated proponent of Coubertin's vision of "Olympism." That fact is evident in his life credo and reflected practices. Was not Diem attempting to carry out one of the baron's last wishes. And besides, had not Coubertin transferred Olympic headquarters from Paris to Lausanne in 1915 at his own whim, with absolutely no consultation with or approval from IOC members? Would this type of authoritarian action not work once again? When World War II opened, Diem, on the threshold of sixty, understandably, was spared from serving in Germany's armed forces. But, there is no doubt that he was anything less than a dedicated patriot. In fact, he had already paid his dues, so to speak, having served with distinction on the Western Front throughout World War I.⁶⁶ *How far might his German patriotism have carried him in Hitler's post-war Olympic world?*

The case for Werner Klingeberg is a bit different than that of Diem, his mentor. The credibility of Sigfrid Edström's assertion that Klingeberg was a German spy, at least on the surface, has to be tempered. It was cast during a time and circumstance that made it popular, even convenient, to hurl such charges. Be that as it may, the record indicates that Klingeberg, a physically fit man in his early thirties at the outbreak of the war, was carefully insulated from serving in the armed forces of the Fatherland, even during the last stages of a desperate German defense. *Was his presence in other arenas of importance a greater priority? How much currency can be attached to his nomination and placement in West Germany's diplomatic corps after the war relative to his war-time contacts? And, what of Klingeberg's activities with the DNB, a well-known propaganda agency under the ultimate responsibility of Joseph Göbbels, a powerful figure who knew Klingeberg, in fact, assigned him to accompany Leni Riefenstahl to America in late 1938? Unlike Carl Diem, there is enough innuendo and unfinished business in researching Klingeberg to prompt the court of inquiry on him to remain in session.*

Finally, in defense of Carl Diem, and to lesser extent, Werner Klingeberg, there is some argument that neither may have become boosters of Hitler's vision for Germany's Olympic future. Each was far better educated than the Führer, indeed, than most of Hitler's Nazi henchmen. They were better read, vastly more traveled, incalculably more cosmopolitan and enlightened. Thus, the hard evidence suggests to us that in Hitler's envisioned post-war world, the demonstrated Olympic career work and philosophies held by Diem, in particular, and Klingeberg, to a lesser degree, may have eventually grated sharply against those of the Führer. Given the omnipotent power of Hitler, however, it takes little imagination to arrive at what might have befallen both Diem and Klingeberg as a result. As Speer reflected in his memoirs: "The Fuehrer proposes and disposes for all."⁶⁷ With the impact and manifold repercussions that such a statement evokes, the Modern Olympic Movement itself is infinitely fortunate that Adolf Hitler and his dreams for "a new world empire," and with it, "a new Olympic world," perished for good in May 1945 in a bunker 40 feet below the ruins of Berlin's Chancellery.

Endnotes

The authors wish to acknowledge the German translation help of Patricia Eckert of the IOC Archives and the French translation assistance of Diane Potvin of the University of New Brunswick.

- 1 *The International Olympic Committee – One Hundred Years: The Ideas, The Presidents, The Achievements, 1894-1994*, Three volumes (Lausanne, IOC, 1994-1996).
- 2 Ibid., "The Presidency of Baillet-Latour (1925-1942), in Vol. I, p. 217. Parentheses ours.
- 3 This intent can be supported by Hitler's argument in the summer of 1939 that the design of the gigantic capital building planned for the Berlin of the future, the imposing dome of which would rise "nine hundred fifty-seven feet in the air" and be crowned by a huge German eagle with a swastika in its claws, had to be changed. Instead of the swastika," he said, "the eagle has to be perched above the globe. To crown this greatest building in the world the eagle must stand above the globe." One might argue the intent of this symbolism, but an 8 May 1943 entry by Joseph Göbbels in his personal diary lends even sharper evidence of intent. Wrote Göbbels: "The Fuehrer expresses his unshakable conviction that the Reich will one day rule all of Europe. We will have to survive a great many conflicts, but they will doubtless lead to the most glorious triumphs. And from then on the road to world domination is practically spread out before us. For whoever rules Europe will be able to seize the leadership of the world." Cited by Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs* (translated from the original German by

Richard and Clara Winston), (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 160.

- 4 Speer, Hermann Göring and Martin Bormann comprised Hitler's most trusted Obersalzberger (those who regularly journeyed from Berlin to enjoy intimate time with the Führer at his mountain retreat on Obersalzberg, located adjacent to Berchtesgaden).
- 5 The grandiose, indeed colossal complex was to be located in Nuremberg.
- 6 The original publication of Hitler's statement is enunciated in Albert Speer's *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs*, p. 70. This passage has been cited in the past by Olympic historians writing in English, originally by Richard D. Mandell in his *The Nazi Olympics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 293; subsequently by John A. Lucas in his *The Modern Olympic Games* (New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1980), p. 131; and later, by others. The stadium, of which a cornerstone was laid and a large trial section structure built, was planned to be the largest of its kind in history, more than double the length of the pyramid of Cheops, triple its cubic yard displacement, towering over 300 feet in order to accommodate 400,000 people. From a more modern perspective, Speer's intended colossus would have succeeded Berlin's huge 1936 Games stadium by well over one million cubic yards (11,100,000 to 9,886,800). History's largest sports venue precedent was the Circus Maximus in ancient Rome, less than half the size of Speer's intended stadium creation. By way of a footnote to this endnote, Speer relates that in 1935 he and his wife visited Greece, where they buried themselves in viewing and studying structures in the Doric style. "I shall never forget," Speer said, "how overwhelmed we were by the reconstructed stadium of Athens" (p. 83). His awe was such that he modeled "Hitler's stadium" after the site of history's first Modern Olympic Games. When one views pictures of Speer's model, it becomes obvious that there is close architectural similarity between the two structures, even though the stadium intended for Nuremberg would have dwarfed that of Athens. The horseshoe shape of Speer's vision (copying Athens) was a necessity; he thought an enclosed, bowl-like amphitheater would result in a claustrophobic atmosphere for such a gigantic assembly of spectators.
- 7 This phrase and feeling was enunciated by Diem in 1940 following Germany's *blitzkrieg* of France. See Carl Diem, "The Battle Charge Through France," *Reichssportsblatt* (official sports organ of the Nazi Party), June 1940. Reprinted in Volume I of his three-volume *Olympische Flame* (Berlin: Deutscher Arkiv, 1942), pp. 127-129. As cited by Richard D. Mandell, "Carl Diem on Sport and War," *Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education*, Volume 5, Number 1, May 1974, p. 13.
- 8 See *Olympische Rundschau*, April 1938, p. 133.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Exactly what Baillet-Latour meant by Diem's "private affairs" is open to debate. Did it mean further entanglement with Nazi-related sports activities? Or, were more benign consequences meant—family, or German National Sport Institute matters?
- 11 March 24, 1936, "Draft of a summary of conversations with Count Baillet-Latour during visit to Tokyo," from notes taken by Russell L. Durgin, Lausanne, International Olympic Committee Archives (hereafter IOCA).
- 12 Werner Klingeberg to Count Henri Baillet-Latour, 16 September 1936, IOCA.
- 13 Baillet-Latour to Werner Klingeberg, 22 September 1936, IOCA.
- 14 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 18 March 1937, IOCA.
- 15 See Wolf Lyberg (ed.), "Minutes of the 37th IOC Session, Warsaw, July 7-12, 1937," in *The IOC Sessions, 1998-1955* (Lausanne: IOC, undated), p. 202.
- 16 Letters from Werner Klingeberg to Henri Baillet-Latour, 5 and 24 August 1937, IOCA.
- 17 As reported in *The Daily Californian*, 12 October 1937, IOCA.
- 18 *The Japan Advertiser*, 30 October 1937, IOCA. *The Japan Advertiser* article also remarked on Klingeberg's youthful age, "still under 30," and recently "received a degree as Master of Physical Education from the University of California in Berkeley." There is no record of Werner Klingeberg ever having attended UC-Berkeley, much less having achieved a degree there.

Neither does a mini biography of him announce such an achievement. See *Rückkehr Nach Olympia: Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland* (München: Copress, 1989), p. 208). Was Klingeberg yet another Sandra Baldwin type, recently dishonored IOC member and USOC President of fabricated vita circumstance?

- 19 Matsuzo Nagai, Secretary General of the Tokyo Olympic Games Organizing Committee, to Baillet-Latour, 19 November 1937, IOCA. In another letter from Nagai to Baillet-Latour (9 December 1937), Nagai reconfirmed the Japanese pleasure at having Klingeberg in Tokyo.
- 20 "Report of the Technical Adviser," 1 December 1937, IOCA. Over the next six months (December 1937-July 1938) Klingeberg faithfully reported progress to Baillet-Latour on the Games Organization, writing some 80 pages of Technical Report material.
- 21 Soyeshima to Baillet-Latour, 2 February 1938, IOCA. Parentheses ours.
- 22 See Wolf Lyberg (ed.), "Minutes of the 38th IOC Session, Cairo, March 13-18, 1938," in *The IOC Sessions, 1894 to 1955* (Lausanne: IOC, undated), p. 211.
- 23 Klingeberg's appointment was actually made by the IOC Executive Committee at its meeting of 6 June 1939 in London. Klingeberg was to receive 20 pounds sterling per month, while at the same time continuing his duties in Helsinki under remuneration by the Finns. See Wolf Lyberg (ed.), "Minutes of the IOC Executive Committee, 6 June 1939, London," in *The Executive Committee - Part I* (Meetings 1 - 84, 1921 to 1969), (Lausanne: IOC, Undated).
- 24 See Wolf Lyberg (ed.), "Minutes of the 29th IOC Executive Committee, 3 September 1938, Brussels," in *The Executive Committee - Part I* (Meetings 1 - 84, 1921 to 1948), (Lausanne: IOC, undated), p. 73-74.
- 25 The entire scenario surrounding the game of "musical chairs" which saw the Summer Games of 1940 moved from Tokyo to Helsinki, and the Winter Games from Sapporo to St. Moritz to Garmisch- Partenkirchen is rendered in a succinct account by Karl Lennartz in *The International Olympic Committee-100 Years, 1894 to 1994: The Ideas, The Presidents, The Achievements*, Volume 1 (Lausanne, IOC, 1994), pp. 278-283.
- 26 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 1 October 1938, IOCA.
- 27 See Lt. Col. Berdez to Werner Klingeberg, 21 November 1938, IOCA.
- 28 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 16 September 1939, IOCA.
- 29 Ibid. (Parentheses ours).
- 30 Cited in Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 16 October 1939, IOCA. Parentheses ours.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 See Leni Riefenstahl, *Leni Riefenstahl: A Memoir* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 286. In her *Memoirs*, Riefenstahl referred to Klingeberg as Klingenberg. For a brief description of the activities of Riefenstahl, Jäger, and Klingeberg (he was referred to as "Werner Klingeberg of the International Olympic Committee) in Los Angeles, see *Los Angeles Times*, 7 January 1939. The phrase "less than triumphant" reflects the fact that Riefenstahl's tour, with regard to *Olympia's* presentation to American mass theater audiences, was largely a failure. Anti-Nazi factions in the United States called for a public boycott of her film. It worked. Only a few intimate screenings of the film took place, for the most part in private residences, including the home of Avery Brundage in Chicago.
- 33 Ibid. Jäger never returned to Germany, abandoning the tour as it was ready to depart New York for Germany. He subsequently established residence in Los Angeles and turned his attention towards producing "yellow journalism," much of it directed at Leni Riefenstahl as a "pawn of the Nazis." See Riefenstahl, pp. 241-244, 247-249, 354-355.
- 34 Circulated memo from Baillet-Latour to all IOC Members, 25 November 1939, IOCA.
- 35 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 23 January 1940, IOCA.

- 36 Ibid. Parentheses ours.
- 37 Baillet-Latour to Klingeberg, 30 January 1940, IOCA. Parentheses ours.
- 38 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 10 February 1940, IOCA.
- 39 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 16 March 1940, IOCA.
- 40 Baillet-Latour to Klingeberg, 21 March 1940, IOCA.
- 41 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 5 April 1940, IOCA. Parentheses ours.
- 42 Baillet-Latour to all IOC Members, 2 May 1940, IOCA.
- 43 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 5 May 1940, IOCA.
- 44 Baillet-Latour complained bitterly to Karl Ritter von Halt about this action. Von Halt's influence with Nazi officials eventually saw them restored to the Count's stables, a situation that was one of the first to push Baillet-Latour towards being viewed by some of his countrymen as an individual under special German favoritism. On this point, see, for instance, George M. Constable, *The Olympic Century* (Vol. 11): *The XI, XII, & XIII Olympiads, Berlin 1936 to St. Moritz 1948* (Los Angeles: World Sport Research & Publications, Inc., 1996), p. 114.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Klingeberg to Baillet-Latour, 13 January 1941, IOCA.
- 47 With the death of Berdez, and Klingeberg, as his successor, in Paris, Madame Zanchi was left alone in Lausanne to staff the office of the IOC Secretariat at *Mon Repos*.
- 48 Klingeberg to Lydia Zanchi, 18 September 1941, IOCA.
- 49 This startling fact was uncovered by Garth Paton on a visit to Paris in 1998, during which time he interviewed an aged employee who worked in the Majestic Hotel building during the course of the war.
- 50 See Alfred E. Senn, *Power, Politics and the Olympic Games* (Champaign, Illinois: Human Kinetics, 1999). pp. 73-74.
- 51 These notations are provided by Wolf Lyberg (ed.), "IOC During World War II," in *The IOC Sessions, 1894-1955* (Lausanne: IOC, undated), pp. 221-222.
- 52 For a description of Baillet-Latour's funeral, and the contrast between Belgian/Dutch vs. German pronouncements, see Anthony Th. Bijkerk, "Setting the Record Straight: What Actually Happened at the Funeral of Count Henri Baillet-Latour, President of the International Olympic Committee from 1926 to His Death in 1942," *Journal of Olympic History*, Vol., 7, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 9-13.
- 53 Klingeberg to Lydia Zanchi, 17 January 1942, IOCA.
- 54 For instance, see Allen Guttman, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Champaign-Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1992), p. 75; and Alfred E. Senn, *Power, Politics and the Olympic Games*, p. 76.
- 55 See John A. Lucas, *The Modern Olympic Games* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Company, 1980), p. 147.
- 56 See Senn, p. 76.
- 57 Klingeberg to Lydia Zanchi, 20 June 1944, IOCA.
- 58 Klingeberg to Zanchi, 15 September and 5 December 1944, IOCA.
- 59 See Klingeberg to Zanchi (9 May 1945); Klingeberg to Mayer (9 July 1945); Klingeberg to Zanchi (21 July 1945); Klingeberg to Edström (19 June 1947); and Klingeberg to Mayer (25 November 1950), IOCA.

- 60 Edstrøm to Mayer, 30 November 1950, IOCA. Edstrøm's statement that Klingeberg's "work is unknown to me" is rather preposterous. After all, Edstrøm was present at the IOC Sessions in 1937, 1938 and 1939 where, in effect, Klingeberg gave oral reports of his work in Tokyo and Helsinki and, as well, took the official minutes of the Sessions. Edstrøm's statement is even more perplexing when one considers that both were together in the intimate confines of the IOC Executive Committee meeting in London in 1939 where Klingeberg was named successor to Berdez at such time as Berdez could no longer execute his duties, which, as it turned out, was a matter of but a few months. Finally, it was at that Executive Committee meeting that the 40 pounds sterling per month salary was granted to Klingeberg.
- 61 Edstrøm to Mayer, 5 December 1950, IOCA.
- 62 For an excellent account of the reestablishment scenario of Germany's National Olympic Committee following World War II, see Jürgen Buschmann, Wolfgang Buss, Hilmar Dressler, Karl Lennartz, Franz Nitsch, Giselher Spitzer, Walter Teutenberg, Walther Tröger, and Heinz Vogel, *Rückkehr Nach Olympia: Nationales Olympisches Komitee für Deutschland, Vorgeschichte Gründung Erste Jahre* (München: Copress Verlag, 1989).
- 63 See Klingeberg to Mayer, 17 June 1964, and Mayer to Klingeberg, 22 June 1964, IOCA. The contents of this exchange focused on nostalgia of Olympic times past, commentary on the Rome Games of 1960, and best wishes for the Games scheduled for Tokyo later in the summer of 1964.
- 64 Klingeberg to Monique Berlioux, 6 June 1975, IOCA.
- 65 Berlioux to Klingeberg, 25 June 1975, IOCA.
- 66 Diem, who enlisted in the German army on August 1, 1914, the first day of The Great War, served in Belgium and France during the entire period of the war. He was seriously wounded at St. Quentin, recovered, and fought courageously in the bitter battles at Champagne and the Argonne. See, George G. Daniels, *The Olympic Century* (Vol. 6): *V and VI Olympiads, Stockholm-The Inter-Allied Games* (Los Angeles: World Sport Research and Publications, Inc., 2000), p. 99.
- 67 See Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs*, p. 33.

